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the issue of access to health care for the millions of Americans who
cannot afford health insurance. The passage of major health care–
reform legislation raises the following questions: What other social justice initiatives may be on the horizon? Might the country turn its attention to access to justice for indigent litigants in the civil justice system?
In August 2006, the American Bar Association (ABA) House of
Delegates passed Resolution 112A, encouraging legislatures to “provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income
persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic
1
human needs are at stake.” This proposal embodies the “Civil Gideon”
movement, which endeavors to achieve a right to appointed counsel
for indigent litigants in the civil context, similar to the Sixth Amendment right in criminal matters the Supreme Court articulated in Gideon
2
v. Wainwright. Calls to expand the right to appointed legal counsel
3
stem from the many legal needs left systemically unmet and the current legal aid system’s inability to satisfy indigent litigants’ demands
4
for legal assistance. Many people proceed without representation in
civil cases, putting themselves at a significant disadvantage when pitted
against sophisticated opposing counsel who are experienced in our
adversarial system of justice. Adverse outcomes are significantly more
5
likely for unrepresented litigants.
Disparate outcomes for unrepresented litigants resulting from their
lack of counsel present a fundamental challenge to a justice system
founded on the principle emblazoned on the Supreme Court’s marble
portico: “Equal Justice Under Law.” In response to ABA Resolution
112A, numerous state and local bar associations passed similar resolutions and established task forces with the goal of expanding the right to
1

AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 112A, at 1
(2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf.
2
372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963).
3
See CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. & THE PUB., AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL NEEDS AND
CIVIL JUSTICE 3-4 (1994), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/
sclaid/legalneedstudy.pdf (finding significant legal needs in a survey of low- and
moderate-income households); see also LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 13-18 (2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/pdfs/documenting_
the_ justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (noting that numerous state organizations replicating the ABA survey often found more unmet need).
4
See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 3, at 12 (reporting that legal aid programs turn
away one potential client for every client that their resources enable them to represent).
5
See generally Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 46-66 (2010)
(surveying studies finding that lack of counsel is a significant variable affecting outcomes
in housing, family, small-claims, and administrative agency actions).
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6

counsel in certain civil matters. Notable among these state efforts, the
7
California legislature—even in the face of the state’s fiscal woes —
recently passed the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, which funds pilot
programs through which lawyers “shall be appointed to represent lowincome parties in civil matters involving critical issues affecting basic
8
human needs.” Following on the heels of California, the American Bar
Association adopted the ABA Model Access Act, intended to “assist
interested legislators” to “establish[] a statutory right to counsel in
those basic areas of human need identified in the 2006 Resolution
9
and . . . provid[e] a mechanism for implementing that right.”
Despite the Civil Gideon movement’s progress, setting Gideon as the
10
movement’s goal may not be ideal. Many commentators and practi11
tioners lament that Gideon has not fulfilled its promise of providing
competent counsel to indigent criminal defendants. One oft-cited
failure is that representation by the defendant’s appointed counsel is
still completely inadequate, in part because of the high threshold to
12
find counsel ineffective on appellate review. Conscience-shocking
examples abound:

6

See Paul Marvy & Laura Klein Abel, Current Developments in Advocacy to Expand the
Civil Right to Counsel, 25 TOURO L. REV. 131, 132-44 (2009) (identifying bar association
efforts in Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington).
7
See Jennifer Steinhauer, New Year but No Relief for Strapped States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2010, at A15 (reporting on California’s projected budget deficit of twenty billion dollars).
8
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651(a) (West Supp. 2010).
9
AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 104, at 6
(2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/104_
Revised_FINAL_Aug_2010.pdf.
10
See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of
the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625,
627 (1986) (detailing how the “severity of the underfunding of those agencies providing defense counsel to the indigent seriously endangers the sixth amendment guarantee to effective assistance of counsel”).
11
See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEF., AM. BAR ASS’N,
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE
41-45 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/
brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf (recommending reforms including funding for indigent
defense at parity with that for prosecution, federal financial assistance, establishment of
state oversight organizations, and a bar on excessive public defender workloads).
12
See, e.g., David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington: Broken
Promises (“By accepting a patently unacceptable status quo as the constitutional baseline for ‘effective’ lawyering, the Court in Strickland practically guaranteed that indigent defendants would obtain effective assistance only through luck, not through a
state-guaranteed right.”), in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 101, 104 (Carol S. Steiker
ed., 2006).
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Courts have declined to find ineffective assistance where defense counsel
slept during portions of the trial, where counsel used heroin and cocaine throughout the trial, . . . where counsel stated prior to trial that he
was not prepared on the law or facts of the case, and where counsel appointed in a capital case could not name a single Supreme Court deci13
sion on the death penalty.

Critics argue that the low standard for effectiveness of counsel,
14
which the Supreme Court established in Strickland v. Washington, not
only vitiates the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel for many criminal defendants, but also provides less incentive
for states to fund indigent defense services adequately. This compounds the problem of inadequate representation by overburdening
15
the public defender system.
Based on the experience under Gideon, legislative efforts to expand the right to appointed counsel in certain categories of civil cases
may not be sufficient to guarantee indigent litigants the right to effective assistance. This Comment evaluates the standards that appellate
courts might use to judge ineffective assistance of counsel in the civil
context in light of current efforts to expand representation in civil
16
cases. The bulk of Civil Gideon scholarship focuses on how a right to
appointed counsel like that announced in Gideon may be achieved in
17
the civil context without addressing whether Gideon is a desirable
goal. Laura K. Abel, Deputy Director of the Justice Program at the
Brennan Center for Justice, provides a rare exception to this general
trend in an article listing the lessons that the Civil Gideon movement

13

Id. at 114 (footnotes omitted) (citing People v. Tippins, 570 N.Y.S.2d 581, 58283 (App. Div. 1991) (sleeping); People v. Badia, 552 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 (App. Div.
1990) (drug use); People v. Dalton, 529 N.Y.S.2d 927, 927 (App. Div. 1988) (unprepared); Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 601 (11th Cir. 1984), as construed in Stephen
B. Bright, Essay, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Penalty Not for the Worst Crime But for the
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1839 (1994) (inability to cite cases)).
14
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
15
See Cole, supra note 12, at 114 (“[B]ecause the Court’s standard uncritically accepts the status quo as ‘effective,’ it creates no incentive for states to improve on existing standards of legal representation for the poor.”).
16
This Comment focuses on the standards by which to judge ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, rather than the procedure for bringing such claims. Thus, it does
not discuss whether such claims should be brought on direct appeal, collaterally
through postconviction review, or—unique to the civil context—via civil procedure
mechanisms, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allows judgments to
be set aside for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” or “any other
reason that justifies relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1), (6).
17
See generally 2006 Edward V. Sparer Symposium, Civil Gideon: Creating a Constitutional Right to Counsel in the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 501 (2006).
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18

can learn from Gideon itself. This Comment evaluates and expands
on a footnote in Deputy Director Abel’s article identifying trends in
Supreme Court jurisprudence in the criminal context that may signal
an opportunity to consider alternatives to the difficulties the Strickland
19
Existing literature addressing ineffective assisstandard presents.
tance of counsel in the civil context specifically singles out the class of
civil cases where states most commonly appoint counsel to indigent
20
litigants: parental rights terminations. This Comment adds to such
literature by examining alternative approaches to the establishment of
a civil right to counsel in light of the broader Civil Gideon movement
and recent developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
This Comment is divided into four Parts. In order to assess the
standards for ineffective assistance of counsel, it is first important to
understand the most likely ways to achieve a Civil Gideon. Therefore,
Part I provides background on Civil Gideon efforts and concludes that
legislation, as opposed to litigation, is the most likely avenue for achieving a meaningful civil right to counsel. Part II examines a potential pitfall for the Civil Gideon movement in light of the havoc that the Strickland standard has wreaked on the right established by Gideon. Part III
assesses the foundations for recognizing a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel for civil litigants against counsel appointed through Civil
Gideon statutes. Finally, Part IV evaluates potential standards for ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that appellate courts ought to

18

See Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons From Gideon v. Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 530 (2006) (“It is imperative that any
exploration of the scope of a civil right to counsel be based on an understanding of
the experience with the criminal right to counsel. This article attempts to draw some
useful lessons from that experience.”).
19
See id. at 547 n.176.
20
See Susan Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination
Cases: The Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 179, 184-99 (2004)
(evaluating the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel in the Supreme Court
and the states for parental rights termination cases); William Wesley Patton, Standards
of Appellate Review for Denial of Counsel and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Child Protection and Parental Severance Cases, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 195, 227-31 (1996) (examining alternatives to Strickland’s prejudice prong in parental rights termination and child protection cases); cf. Robert S. Catz & Nancy Lee Firak, The Right to Appointed Counsel in
Quasi-Criminal Cases: Towards an Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard, 19 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 397, 467 (1984) (advocating, pre-Strickland, the adoption of an “objective
standard of constitutionally effective assistance of counsel” in civil cases where liberty
interests are at stake, including parental rights termination cases).
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adopt a professional-guidelines-based approach that subjects an attor21
ney’s performance to stricter review than Strickland.
I. AVENUES FOR ESTABLISHING A CIVIL GIDEON
In his landmark opinion in Gideon, Justice Black concluded that
“in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems . . . to be an obvious
22
23
truth.” With these words, the Supreme Court overruled Betts v. Brady,
which held that the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments did not necessarily require the state to provide attorneys
24
to criminal defendants who could not afford them. Three decades
25
before Gideon, the Court used “reason and reflection” to arrive at a
similar conclusion in the infamous Scottsboro trial, and such reasoning
appears no less applicable in the civil context: “Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of
26
law.” Gideon, however, grounded the right to counsel in the Sixth
27
Amendment, which specifically addresses “all criminal prosecutions.”
This Part examines judicial and legislative avenues for establishing a
Civil Gideon and concludes that, between these strategies, legislative efforts are the most likely avenue for progress toward a Civil Gideon.
A. Judicial Strategies
There are three possible judicial strategies for achieving a Civil
Gideon: federal due process claims, federal equal protection claims,
and state constitutional claims. Although a Civil Gideon would suggest
21

Throughout this Comment, “stricter standard than Strickland” refers to a standard
that is stricter in scrutinizing the lawyers’ conduct by requiring that conduct to reach a
higher threshold to be deemed effective, not a harder test for the claimant to meet.
22
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
23
316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
24
See id. at 471 (“[W]e are unable to say that the concept of due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the States, whatever may be their own
views, to furnish counsel in every such case.”).
25
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
26
Id. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). In Betts v. Brady,
the Court recognized that the logic in favor of a per se right to counsel is the same in
the civil context as in the criminal context. See Abel, supra note 18, at 530-31 (“The
Court also noted that, were it accepted, the logic of Betts’ argument would require the
appointment of counsel not only in criminal cases, but in civil cases too.” (citing Betts,
316 U.S. at 473)).
27
See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339-45; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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a right to appointed counsel in a broad array of civil cases, the cases
discussed in this Section are primarily parental rights termination cases because the interest at stake is among the weightiest in the civil justice system, making such cases especially compelling for developing a
28
right to appointed counsel in civil cases. These litigation efforts,
however, face major hurdles that may prevent them from effectively
establishing a Civil Gideon.
1. Federal Due Process Claims
The forcefulness with which the Gideon Court identified the right
to counsel as a “fundamental right,” applicable to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment, made the Due Process Clause a natural ave29
nue by which to achieve a Civil Gideon. The Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect “liberty” interests with
two separate guarantees—“procedural due process” and “substantive
30
due process” —both of which may be implicated in civil cases with
indigent litigants. When “governmental decisions . . . deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests,” procedural due process places
limitations on the process the government may use in order to ensure
individuals have the “opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and
31
in a meaningful manner.’” The argument that indigent defendants
are denied due process of law when they forfeit important rights in civil
cases as a consequence of the absence of counsel fits well within the
language of procedural due process. Substantive due process, which
inquires into whether the government has sufficient justification to take
away an individual’s “fundamental rights,” may also be implicated. For
example, the Court has recognized that a parent’s “‘care, custody, and
management of his or her children’” is a fundamental right for the

28

See Steven D. Schwinn, The Right to Counsel on Appeal: Civil Douglas, 15 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 603, 606 (2006) (“Because of the weight of the interest, parental rights and cases seeking to terminate parental rights have been the primary focus of
Civil Gideon litigation.”).
29
See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43 (“We think the Court in Betts was wrong . . . in
concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights. Ten years before Betts v. Brady, this Court . . . had unequivocally declared that ‘the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental character.’” (quoting
Powell, 287 U.S. at 68)).
30
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 545 (3d ed. 2006).
31
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976) (quoting Amstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
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32

purposes of the Due Process Clause.
The Court, however, largely
precluded due process as a means of achieving a Civil Gideon in Lassiter
33
v. Department of Social Services, a parental rights termination appeal.
Civil Gideon’s fate under the federal Due Process Clause could not
34
have hinged on a less sympathetic case. In a prior proceeding, Abby
Gail Lassiter lost custody of her infant child to the Durham County
Department of Social Services for failing to provide proper medical
care after her mother complained that Lassiter left the children “with
35
her for days without providing money or food while she was gone.”
Between the time of that adjudication and when the state terminated
Lassiter’s parental rights, Lassiter was convicted of and imprisoned for
second-degree murder after using a butcher knife to repeatedly stab
36
her victim. In the two years since the state took custody, Lassiter had
not been in contact with the Department of Social Services and had
not seen her child, “except for one prearranged visit and a chance
37
meeting on the street.”
On appeal, the Supreme Court denied Lassiter’s claim that the
“Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled her to the
38
assistance of counsel.” Instead, the Court established a case-by-case
determination for when due process requires appointment of counsel
39
based on the three factors identified in Mathews v. Eldridge, the seminal
case establishing the test to determine what process is required under
the Due Process Clause. The three factors are “the private interests at
stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used
40
will lead to erroneous decisions.” The Court, however, subjected the
application of the Mathews factors in this context to a presumption—
drawn from post-Gideon cases that had limited Gideon’s ambitious
scope—“that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only

32

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
33
See 452 U.S. at 31 (holding that due process does not require “the appointment
of counsel in every parental termination proceeding”).
34
See, e.g., Michael Millemann, The State Due Process Justification for a Right to Counsel
in Some Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733, 739 (2006) (“Lassiter ’s facts,
at least the facts that the Court emphasized in its opinion, made it a bad test case.”).
35
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20, 23.
36
Id. at 20 n.1.
37
Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38
See id. at 24, 33 (concluding that the trial court did not err by failing to appoint
Lassiter counsel).
39
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
40
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
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when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.” An indigent civil litigant who wishes to claim a due process right to appointed counsel must not only demonstrate a favorable balance under
the Mathews factors, but a balance sufficiently weighty to overcome this
42
presumption. By setting the bar so high for indigent civil litigants to
be appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause, the Court not
only instituted the type of case-by-case judgments found to be deficient in the criminal context by Gideon but also ensured that very few
civil litigants could meet the standard for constitutionally required
appointment of counsel.
There are many convincing arguments that Lassiter should be
overruled. Just as the Court eventually overruled Betts after twenty-one
years, the time for the Court to overrule Lassiter is overdue because
the factors which led the Court to overrule Betts now exist with respect
to Lassiter, including “widespread academic condemnation” and the
43
impracticalities of case-by-case determinations. Among the academic
critics, Laura Abel identifies those who argue that Lassiter undermines
44
the judicial system’s legitimacy, those who challenge the particular
45
balance struck between the Mathews factors by the Lassister Court,
and those who point out “that the United States is anomalous in fail46
ing to guarantee a right to counsel in important civil cases.”
41

Id. at 26-27. For post-Gideon decisions limiting the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases, see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979),
which limited the right to appointed counsel to cases where the defendant is “sentenced to a term of imprisonment,” and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973),
which rejected a per se right to counsel at probation revocation hearings.
42
See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 (“The dispositive question . . . is whether the three
Eldridge factors, when weighed against the presumption that there is no right to appointed counsel in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of physical liberty,
suffice to rebut that presumption . . . .”).
43
Abel, supra note 18, at 531-32.
44
Id. (“‘[W]here crucial interests are at issue, legal standards are imprecise and
subjective, proceedings are formal and adversarial, and resources between the parties
are grossly imbalanced,’” undermining “‘the legitimacy of the justice system.’” (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1799 (2001))).
45
Id. at 532 (attributing to Judge Sweet the broad proposition that the third factor
dictates appointment “‘whenever in forma pauperis status exists. . . . As every trial judge
knows, the task of determining the correct legal outcome is rendered almost impossible without effective counsel.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Robert W. Sweet, Civil
Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 505 (1998))).
46
Id. (citing Paul Marvy & Debra Gardner, A Civil Right to Counsel for the Poor,
HUM. RTS., Summer 2005, at 8, 8); see also Earl Johnson, Jr., Will Gideon’s Trumpet Sound
a New Melody? The Globalization of Constitutional Values and Its Implications for a Right to
Equal Justice in Civil Cases, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 201, 202 (2003) (“The European
Court [of Human Rights] reached the opposite conclusion [to Lassiter], holding the
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While the recognition of foreign and international law in recent
Supreme Court opinions may suggest a willingness by the Court to
47
recognize the arguments of these latter critics, two factors will likely
frustrate any effort to mount a direct assault on Lassiter. First, just as
Lassiter came well after the high-water mark of progressive judicial
opinions to which Gideon belonged, the continued conservative shift
within the judiciary makes it unlikely that a majority of the Court will
look favorably on a ruling that would impose significant new duties
and costs on states. Second, in the absence of a Civil Gideon, legal reformers have developed other mechanisms for aiding pro se litigants
that may complicate a clear balancing of the third Mathews factor, “the
48
risk of an erroneous deprivation.” For example, pro se litigants may
have access to help centers, information tables, pro se clinics, “lawyerof-the-day” programs, assistance hotlines, informational websites and
booklets provided by the court, legal aid systems, pro bono attorneys,
49
or law school clinics. Furthermore, in an effort to aid pro se litigants, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct—and the legal ethics
rules in many states based on those Rules—were amended in 2002 to
allow for “limited scope” or “unbundled” representation as an alterna50
tive to costly full representation. To the extent that these measures

European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . . . and its guarantee of a fair hearing in civil cases required the government to provide free counsel
to indigent civil litigants . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
47
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (highlighting foreign
and international law against the execution of juveniles as inconsistent with U.S. law);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003) (citing with approval cases from the
European Court of Human Rights that recognized sexual autonomy “as an integral
part of human freedom in many other countries”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317
n.21 (2002) (citing an amicus brief from the European Union to support the proposition that “within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved”); see also
Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon: A Human Right Elsewhere in the World, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 288, 289 (2006) (citing Roper, Lawrence, and Atkins to argue that “a frontal challenge to Lassiter may be reasonable at this time”).
48
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
49
See Russell Engler, And Justice For All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting
the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1999-2006 (1999)
(describing the limited-assistance programs provided to pro se litigants by sources inside and outside of the courthouse).
50
See Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can
Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 563, 567-68 (2007) (explaining the changes in legal ethics rules allowing
for limited-scope representation and arguing that these new rules enhance the representation of the indigent community). But cf. Robert Bickel, Limited Legal Services: Is It
Worth It?, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 331, 331 (2006) (“[T]he provision of limited
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in fact diminish the risk of erroneous deprivations, federal courts may
find that, where such measures are available, court decisions not to
provide indigent civil litigants with counsel more easily satisfy the Ma51
thews balancing test. At the very least, federal courts may be reluctant
to issue a broad right-to-counsel ruling that would stifle state experimentation before evaluating the effectiveness of such a measure.
2. Federal Equal Protection Claims
Another federal litigation option available to the Civil Gideon
movement is to mount an equal protection end run around Lassiter.
Traditionally, the Equal Protection Clause operates by subjecting a law
to heightened scrutiny when it discriminates between members of a
52
suspect class. If a suspect class is not involved, the law is given a virtual
green light under rational basis review, compared to the virtual red
53
light a law would receive should a court subject it to strict scrutiny.
The traditional approach, however, is not a promising avenue by
which to achieve a Civil Gideon because the Supreme Court does not
recognize wealth as a suspect classification, and therefore courts require that classification to be only rationally related to a legitimate go54
vernmental purpose.
The Court’s denial of suspect classifcation status to wealth, however,
does not completely foreclose an equal protection litigation strategy.
55
The “fundamental interest branch of equal protection law” provides
a much more promising avenue for achieving a Civil Gideon because it

legal services to [the indigent] community is not only inefficient, but fails to achieve its
own goal of providing real help to more clients.”).
51
Focusing on the second Mathews factor, Michael Millemann argues that, to the
extent that limited-scope representation reduces the costs of providing representation,
it would “thereby reduce the State’s disinterest in providing counsel. In the Mathews
balance of interests, this could help to tip the balance in favor of a right to counsel.”
Millemann, supra note 34, at 738. But because the Lassiter Court characterized states’
fiscal interests in avoiding the costs associated with providing counsel as “relatively
weak” to begin with, limited-scope representation would likely have a larger negative
impact under the third Mathews factor—risk of erroneous deprivation—than it would
have a positive effect under the second factor. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452
U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (“[T]he State . . . has a relatively weak pecuniary interest . . . .”).
52
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 669-70.
53
See id. at 671-72.
54
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (“[T]his
Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny . . . .”).
55
Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 1375, 1413 (2010).
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focuses on equal access to opportunities provided by the govern56
ment.
Although “undertheorized and poorly understood,” this
prong of equal protection jurisprudence applies a “presumption of
unconstitutionality . . . where a liberty concern meets an equality concern, even if neither the interference nor the inequality standing
57
alone would be enough to create such a presumption.”
Notably, equal-access-to-justice victories have already been achieved
under the fundamental interest prong. In M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Court
held that a state requiring litigants to procure a trial transcript as a
prerequisite to appeal must provide trial transcripts to indigent parents when they appeal adverse judgments in parental rights termina58
tions.
The Court recognized that in access-to-justice cases like
59
M.L.B., “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge.” A
state need not provide indigent parents the opportunity to appeal because there is no due process right to a civil appeal. However, a state
providing for appeals must ensure equal access to the appellate
process, regardless of ability to pay, where the “character and intensity
of the individual interest at stake” are strong, as in parental rights
60
terminations. Applying the logic of the M.L.B. decision in the Civil
Gideon context, it could be argued that because the government allows
individuals to have counsel in civil cases, and especially because the
state affirmatively grants a monopoly to lawyers in providing legal services, the state must make reasonable efforts to ensure that access to

56

See id. at 1413-14 (discussing the notion that certain government programs, if
established, must be “equally available” to all).
57
Id. at 1413; see also Nelson Tebbe, Deborah Widiss & Shannon Gilreath, Debate,
The Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 21, 25 (2010),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Marriage.pdf (Tebbe & Widiss, Opening
Statement) (“Equal access . . . recognizes a harm may exist even if the relevant conduct
is not protected by due process and even if the exclusion is not based on a suspect classification.”). Tebbe and Widiss use voting rights cases as an example of a fundamental
interest argument. Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 55, at 1417-19. Even though the “Constitution is not commonly thought to guarantee a right to vote in presidential or state
elections,” and wealth classifications do not usually trigger strict scrutiny, the Court
invalidated poll taxes as unconstitutional because restrictions on voting implicate a
fundamental interest. See id. at 1417-19 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 667-68 (1966)).
58
See 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996) (“[W]e hold that Mississippi may not withhold
from M. L. B. ‘a record of sufficient completeness to permit proper [appellate] consideration of [her] claims.’” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198 (1971))).
59
Id. at 120 (alteration in original) (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,
665 (1983)).
60
Id.
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the services of this professional monopoly is available on an equal basis, at least where an individual’s fundamental rights or fundamental
61
interests are at stake in the litigation.
Although the equal access argument appears to be the most promising federal litigation strategy for achieving a Civil Gideon, the
Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case that squarely
62
addressed the issue. Rhine v. Deaton involved a Texas parental rights
termination suit brought against an infant’s biological mother by his
temporary foster parents, distinguishing it from the state-initiated
63
parental rights termination in Lassiter. Texas gives parents a statutory
right to appointed counsel in which the state initiates a parental rights
64
termination. At issue in the case was whether Texas violated the
Equal Protection Clause by granting indigent parents appointed
counsel in state-initiated proceedings while denying the same right to
65
indigent parents in private termination suits. Access to appellate
courts was also at issue in the case because the mother was unable to
pay $405 for the trial transcript, and therefore the appellate court
66
could not review most of the issues she raised. Even though the state

61

One commentator argues that equal protection claims may serve as a basis for
achieving a Civil Gideon by first establishing a right to appointed counsel in civil appeals, a “Civil Douglas” (named after Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963),
which recognized a right to counsel on the first appeal from a criminal conviction).
See Schwinn, supra note 28, at 604 (“Just as Douglas foreshadowed the categorical right
to counsel at trial in Gideon forty-three years ago, Civil Douglas would certainly foreshadow the categorical civil right to counsel, Civil Gideon.” (footnote omitted)).
Schwinn concludes that the equal protection analysis used in the line of decisions
culminating in M.L.B. is a promising avenue for establishing a Civil Douglas, and ultimately a Civil Gideon, because the inquiry focuses on the “priority of equality in
process.” Id. at 609. This focus is in contrast to emphasizing the “underlying interests
at issue,” which is the focus of the Lassiter presumption currently inhibiting a due
process route to Civil Gideon. Id.
62
See Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 1281, 1281 (2010) (mem.) (denying writ of certiorari).
63
See Mary Alice Robbins, Cert Sought over Right to Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination Case, TEX. LAW., July 13, 2009, at 5, 5 (describing the history of the privately initiated termination suit in which certiorari was sought).
64
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West Supp. 2009) (discussing the requirements for the appointment of an attorney ad litem in suits involving termination of the
parent-child relationship).
65
See Robbins, supra note 63, at 5 (stating that the Court had the option to appoint counsel in private suits, but was not required to as it was under section 107.013 in
state-initiated proceedings).
66
In re Interest of J.C., 250 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. App. 2008) (“We cannot review
Tracy’s first three issues in the absence of a reporter’s record.”). Although the court
recognized an indigent litigant’s right to a transcript, as the Supreme Court held in
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appellate court lacked a trial record from which to weigh the Mathews
67
factors under Lassiter, it denied her claim to appointed counsel. In a
rare move, the Court invited the Texas Solicitor General to file a brief
on behalf of the state addressing whether the Court should take up
68
the case; Texas’s brief recommended that the Court deny certiorari.
If Texas’s brief in Rhine is an indication of state government opposition
to a broad-based ruling in favor of the right to counsel on equal protection grounds, then it is possible that an equal protection litigation
strategy may hurt the Civil Gideon cause. If states cannot distinguish
between litigants when deciding who will receive a statutory right to
appointed counsel, state legislatures may respond to an equal protection ruling by repealing existing statutory rights or reconsidering the
69
expansion of the right to counsel in other contexts.
3. State Constitutional Claims
The barriers to a federal litigation strategy suggest that litigation
of right-to-counsel issues may fare better in state courts than federal
courts because state courts are free to interpret state constitutions to
provide greater protection than the federal Constitution. In Lassiter,
the Court recognized that states might reach different conclusions on
the propriety of providing attorneys to indigent defendants in civil
70
cases. State appellate court decisions have produced some limited
success in expanding the right to counsel in parental rights termination cases. Some state courts reject Lassiter on state procedural due
process grounds and extend the right to appointed counsel to private

M.L.B., the issue was not raised on appeal. See id. at 488 n.3 (noting that the mother
did not appeal the trial court’s order requiring her to pay for the reporter’s record).
67
See id. at 489 (“Because Tracy’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to a
private termination suit, she possessed no mandatory statutory right to appointed
counsel . . . .”).
68
See Brief for the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae at 5, Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct.
1281 (2010) (No. 08-1596) (explaining that there is no justification for creating an exception to allow the petition to raise federal claims that were not decided in state
court, and that the claims are insubstantial).
69
See Schwinn, supra note 28, at 608 n.37 (“If states are concerned about the disparity in statutory right-to-counsel under different statutory schemes of the same general type (e.g., schemes terminating parental rights), they may simply revoke the statutory right to counsel in all statutory schemes of that type to avoid the disparate
treatment and equal protection problems.”).
70
See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981) (“The Court’s opinion
today in no way implies that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opinion and now widely followed by the States are other than enlightened and wise.”).
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71

termination proceedings. Several state courts have reached the same
72
result on state equal protection grounds. Based on these successes,
one optimistic commentator concluded that “it should be reasonably
possible to substantially expand the right to counsel in civil cases
through litigation in state courts based on the due process provisions
73
of state constitutions.”
Beyond parental rights termination proceedings, however, state
appellate courts have been reluctant to recognize a right to appointed
counsel on constitutional grounds. In a recent case before the Alaska
74
Supreme Court—for which the ABA submitted an amicus brief —the
court refused to take up the issue of whether an indigent mother was
entitled to an attorney in a custody proceeding in which the other
75
party was represented by a private attorney. Despite prior progressive
court opinions expanding the right to counsel in custody proceedings
76
where the opposing party was represented by a public agency, the
Alaska Supreme Court dismissed the case after focusing on unrelated
77
In contrast, the Washington Supreme Court
mootness grounds.
addressed the right-to-counsel issue head on, holding that due process
did not require the trial court to appoint counsel to a wife in a divorce
proceeding in which the lower court granted primary residential care
78
of the child to the husband. Prior to that decision, a Washington
71

See Millemann, supra note 34, at 748-56 (recounting right-to-counsel decisions
based upon state constitutional grounds in Alaska, California, Florida, and Kansas);
Schwinn, supra note 28, at 607 n.35 (noting state appellate decisions recognizing a
right to counsel in private terminations in Alaska, California, Maine, and Montana).
72
See Millemann, supra note 34, at 736 n.21 (listing several state court decisions
finding a right to counsel based on equal protection in adoption cases, including cases
from Illinois, Iowa, North Dakota, and Oregon).
73
Id. at 765.
74
See Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee Siv Jonsson at 1, Office of Pub. Advocacy v. Alaska Court Sys., No. S-12999 (Alaska
Nov. 19, 2008), 2008 WL 5585565, at *1 (stating the ABA’s support for the appointment of counsel in civil cases, such as child custody cases, where basic human needs
are at stake).
75
See Alaska Supreme Court Declines to Rule on Right to Counsel, CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS.
UPDATE (Nat’l Coal. for a Civil Right to Counsel, Baltimore, Md.), Oct. 2009, available at
http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/pdfs/2009%20October%20Civil%20Right%20to%
20Counsel%20Update.pdf.
76
See Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 895, 896 n.12 (Alaska 1979) (holding that due
process required courts to appoint counsel in “cases involving child custody where an
indigent party’s opponent is represented by counsel provided by a public agency”).
77
See Alaska Supreme Court Declines to Rule on Right to Counsel, supra note 75.
78
See King v. King, 174 P.3d 659, 661-63 (Wash. 2007) (“The interest at stake here
is not commensurate with the fundamental parental liberty interest at stake in a termination or dependency proceeding.”).
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appellate court “reversed orders modifying a parenting plan and holding the pro se mother in contempt, but declined to order appointment
79
of counsel in the custody modification proceedings.” Similarly, the
high courts in Maryland and Wisconsin declined to address right-to80
counsel issues in custody cases. Although the Washington Supreme
Court decision is the only decision discussed above that squarely denied
a right-to-counsel claim on state constitutional grounds, the tendency of
other courts to avoid the issue on justiciability grounds suggests a reluctance within state judiciaries to expand the right to appointed counsel.
B. Legislative Strategies
Legislative strategies for achieving a Civil Gideon appear better positioned than judicial strategies because of the volume of statutes providing for appointed counsel and the current state and local efforts to
expand the civil right to counsel—inspired by ABA Resolution 112A.
When the Court decided Lassiter, thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia already had statutes requiring counsel in parental rights
81
termination cases. Laura Abel and Max Rettig’s article compiles a
thorough list of statutes currently on the books, finding that “[o]ver the
past few decades, states have passed hundreds of laws . . . guaranteeing
82
the right to counsel in a wide variety of civil cases.” Of the family law
matters where Abel and Rettig identify right-to-counsel statutes, the
most common statutory grants of counsel are for children involved in
83
dependency proceedings, parents defending against state-initiated
parental rights termination proceedings, and parents in dependency
84
proceedings. Although rare, Abel and Rettig also identify states that
79

Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social
Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 697, 702 (2006) (citing In re Custody of
Halls, 109 P.3d 15, 17 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)).
80
See Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114, 115 (Md. 2003) (finding a mother’s right-tocounsel claim in a custody case moot); Engler, supra note 79, at 702 (citing Kelly v. Circuit Court, No. 04-2999 (Wis. Apr. 6, 2005) (declining to reach the Civil Gideon issue in
denying the petition for original jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment action)).
81
Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights
Proceedings: The States’ Response to Lassiter, 14 TOURO L. REV. 247, 256 (1997).
82
Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245, 245 (2006).
83
See id. (“Federal law requires states receiving federal child abuse prevention and
treatment funding to appoint a representative for children involved in abuse or neglect proceedings.”).
84
See id. at 246 n.6 (citing ASTRA OUTLEY, PEW COMM’N ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER
CARE, REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS 7
(2003), available at http://www.pewfostercare.org/research/docs/Representation.pdf)

BROWN SECOND REVISED FINAL ACCEPTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Establishing Rights Without Remedies?

2/11/2011 9:48 AM

909

grant a right to counsel in domestic violence proceedings, divorces and
annulments, private termination proceedings, paternity proceedings,
proceedings regarding visitation or permanency for children in foster
85
care, and child custody, support, and visitation proceedings. In addition to family matters, most states have statutes granting a right to
appointed counsel in involuntary civil commitment cases, and a few
states have statutes addressing particular medical treatments, such as
86
judicial bypass proceedings for minors seeking abortions.
The scope of current efforts drawing inspiration from ABA Resolution 112A is not limited to the three most common categories of
87
current state right-to-counsel statutes that Abel and Rettig identify.
Favoring an “incremental approach” to expanding the right to
appointed counsel in cases where “basic human needs are at stake,”
the ABA defines “basic human needs” cases as involving either shelter
(e.g., eviction proceedings), sustenance (e.g., “denials of or termination of government payments or benefits”), safety (e.g., “proceedings
to obtain or enforce restraining orders”), health (e.g., claims to Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance for “access to appropriate health
88
care for treatment of significant health problems”), or child custody.
Numerous state and local bar associations are following the ABA’s
lead, establishing committees and task forces to recommend ways to
89
expand the right to counsel in their jurisdictions. Notable among
these efforts is a report issued by the Boston Bar Association Task
Force on Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel, which recommends
that the legislature fund pilot programs to establish rights to counsel
for civil cases that are quasi-criminal (such as immigration and juvenile

(“[S]ix states require that counsel be appointed for indigent parents in all dependency
proceedings, thirty-nine require that counsel be provided for indigent parents in at
least some dependency proceedings, three require that counsel be provided for indigent parents in termination-of-parental-rights cases only, and three do not have statues
‘explicitly’ providing for the appointment of counsel for parents in any dependency or
termination-of-parental-rights cases.”).
85
Id. at 246.
86
See id. at 246-47.
87
See id. at 245-47 (identifying family law; involuntary commitment, quarantine, or
removal of legal rights; and medical treatment as the most common categories of state
right-to-counsel claims).
88
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 1, at 12-13.
89
See Marvy & Abel, supra note 6, at 132-44 (acknowledging eleven states’ efforts to
expand the civil right to counsel).
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cases in which litigants risk being deprived of their physical liberty), as
90
well as family and housing cases.
Funding is the most significant obstacle facing these legislative
efforts, but it is not an insurmountable challenge. A recent Texas study
estimates that legal aid services produce “$457.6 million in spending,
$219.7 million in output (gross product), and 3,171 jobs,” in addition to
generating “approximately $30.5 million in yearly fiscal revenues to
State and local governmental entities, which is well above their approx91
imately $4.8 million in contributions.” Civil Gideon legislation efforts
may have economic and societal benefits because they “(1) reduce the
need for safety-net programs, rearrests of juvenile offenders, the time
children spend in foster care, and the incidence of domestic violence;
(2) improve clients’ health; and (3) bring federal funding into a
92
state.” Legislators’ awareness of the larger social benefits and costsaving potential of Civil Gideon legislation has already positively influ93
enced the debates over the right to counsel in several state legislatures.
The most significant piece of legislation passed as a result of these
efforts is California’s Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, which finances
pilot programs proposed by legal aid organizations by increasing court
94
fees for prevailing parties by ten dollars. The Act directs the pilot programs to provide counsel to indigent litigants in selected courts “in civil
matters involving housing-related matters, domestic-violence and civil
harassment restraining orders, probate conservatorships, guardianships
of the person, elder abuse, or actions by a parent to obtain sole legal or
90

See BOSTON BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL,
GIDEON’S NEW TRUMPET: EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASSACHUSETTS
2 (2008), available at http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf
(recommending “starting points for an expanded civil right to counsel” in Massachusetts).
91
THE PERRYMAN GROUP, THE IMPACT OF LEGAL AID SERVICES ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN TEXAS: AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT EFFORTS AND EXPANSION POTENTIAL 3
(2009) (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.texasatj.org/files/file/Perryman%
20Report.pdf.
92
Laura K. Abel & Susan Vignola, Economic and Other Benefits Associated with the Provision of Civil Legal Aid, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 139, 155 (2011).
93
See id. at 158 (“Legislators in Arkansas, Montana, and Texas were motivated to
expand the right to counsel in child welfare cases by evidence that providing parents
with counsel would reduce the days that children spend in expensive foster care.”); cf.
William Glaberson, Judge’s Budget Will Seek Big Expansion of Legal Aid to the Poor in Civil
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (N.Y. ed.), Nov. 29, 2010, at A21 (reporting that a task force created
by New York’s chief judge “makes a detailed argument that providing more lawyers for
people with low incomes would be cost-efficient for the state”).
94
See Carol J. Williams, State Gives Poor a New Legal Right, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009,
at 8, available at 2009 WLNR 20533552.
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95

physical custody of a child.” The Act also directs the judiciary to conduct studies to determine the effectiveness of the pilot programs, the
results of which are sure to “be closely watched by access-to-justice advo96
cates across the country.” If California’s progress is any indication of
the Civil Gideon movement’s trajectory, the most likely avenue for
expanding the right to counsel is through legislative strategies.
II. EVALUATING THE GOAL IN LIGHT OF GIDEON ’S FLAWS
Although the right to appointed counsel is likely to expand as the
Civil Gideon movement’s legislative strategy gains momentum, the
lessons learned from nearly five decades of experimentation in indigent
criminal defense leaves some open questions: What is the nature of the
right the Civil Gideon movement intends to give indigent civil litigants?
What should be the remedy when that right is violated? In the criminal
context, courts afford indigent defendants who are appointed attorneys
a claim of ineffective assistance as recourse when they have been
deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. An examination
of current statutory rights in the civil context reveals that many courts in
parental rights termination cases adopt essentially the same standard
for effectiveness of counsel used in criminal cases, “often without analy97
sis of its applicability in a non-criminal context.” This Part analyzes the
standard the Supreme Court developed in the criminal context and
concludes that its leniency in finding effective assistance of counsel may
frustrate the benefits the Civil Gideon movement seeks.
Even before Gideon, the Supreme Court recognized that where a
criminal defendant was entitled to appointed counsel, he also had a
98
right to effective assistance of counsel. In the trial of nine young black
men charged with the rape of two young white women while traveling
on a freight train through Alabama, the trial court attempted to appoint the defendants’ counsel by “appoint[ing] the whole bar of
Scottsboro (six men) to represent them. Only one attorney agreed to
99
do so, and he did so only on the morning of trial.” The defendants,
who had previously escaped a lynch mob when first arrested, were sen-

95
96
97
98
99

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651(b)(1) (West Supp. 2010).
Williams, supra note 94.
Calkins, supra note 20, at 212.
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 56, 71 (1932).
Cole, supra note 12, at 106.
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100

tenced to death.
Emphasizing the “especially strong facts pre101
sented,” the Supreme Court held not only that the defendants were
entitled to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment but that they had been deprived of this right—
despite the trial court’s attempt to appoint counsel—because the
“designation of counsel as was attempted was either so indefinite or so
close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of effective and substantial
102
Post-Gideon, the Court echoed the concern about effectiveness
aid.”
of counsel in a line of cases addressing government interference with
103
the ability of lawyers to mount effective defenses. Not until 1984 did
the Court address the standard for “actual ineffectiveness,” noting that
it occurs when counsel “[deprives] a defendant of the right to effective
104
assistance, simply by failing to render ‘adequate legal assistance.’”
When the Court finally took up the issue, the facts of the case, like
the unsympathetic facts in Lassiter, made Strickland v. Washington
“probably the worst possible case to set forth the parameters for
105
effective assistance of counsel.”
Professor David Cole describes the
disturbing history behind the case that would unfortunately establish
the limits upon the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in
criminal cases:
On a two-week crime spree in September 1976, David Leroy Washington
robbed and killed a minister because he was a homosexual; robbed and
killed a woman in her home while her three elderly sisters-in-law watched while bound and gagged, and then shot all three of the sisters-in-law
in the head; and kidnapped a man, stabbed him repeatedly, and even106
tually killed him.

Prior to defining a constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel
standard, the Court noted that Washington appeared to be the source
of many of his appointed attorney’s difficulties at the trial level—

100

See id. (“The defendants, taken off the train at Scottsboro, narrowly escaped a
lynch mob, but were then promptly sentenced to death within a matter of days, as
thousands stood outside the courthouse door and cheered.”).
101
Id.
102
Powell, 287 U.S. at 53.
103
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“Government violates
the right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of
counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.”).
104
Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)).
105
Cole, supra note 12, at 108; see also George C. Thomas III, History’s Lesson for the
Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 549 (describing Strickland as “The Case from
Hell”).
106
Cole, supra note 12, at 108.
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leading the attorney to experience a “sense of hopelessness about the
107
case.”
As a result of this “hopelessness,” the attorney did not make
much of an effort in preparing evidence of mitigating circumstances
for the sentencing phase of trial, at which Washington was sentenced
108
On appeal of his death sentence, however, Washington
to death.
challenged the appointed trial counsel’s effectiveness, alleging several
specific claims concerning his attorney’s preparation and perfor109
mance at the sentencing phase of trial.
Addressing these issues, the Supreme Court established a two-prong
test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel appeals, with the
110
burden of proof for both elements resting on the defendant.
First,
the defendant must demonstrate “that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the de111
fendant by the Sixth Amendment.” The standard for measuring this
“performance” prong is “reasonableness under prevailing professional
112
norms.” But the Court did not stop there; it also established a “strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of rea113
Second, the Court established a
sonable professional assistance.”
“prejudice” prong, requiring the defendant to show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the re114
The Court acsult of the proceeding would have been different.”
knowledged that the Strickland test is “highly deferential” in order to
107

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672. The Court noted that, despite his counsel’s advice,
Washington confessed to the murders, waived his right to a jury trial, and pleaded
guilty to all charges. Id.
108
See Cole, supra note 12, at 109-10 (characterizing Washington’s defense attorney’s explanations for failing to conduct presentencing investigation as “inconsistent”).
109
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675 (“[Washington] asserted that counsel was ineffective because he failed to move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a
psychiatric report, to investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence
investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to
investigate the medical examiner’s reports or cross-examine the medical experts.”).
110
See id. at 687 (“Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that
the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable.”).
111
Id.
112
Id. at 688. The Court declined to adopt more specific performance guidelines,
such as the ABA Criminal Justice Standards. See id. at 688-89 (stating that these are only
“guides” for a reasonableness determination). Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, concluded that such guidelines may be informative but would hamper the independent professional judgment of counsel and “distract counsel from the overriding
mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s cause” if incorporated as standards for
measuring effectiveness of counsel. Id. at 689.
113
Id. at 689.
114
Id. at 694.
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prevent postconviction second-guessing in the interest of finality.
With respect to the facts in Strickland, the Court held that the attorney’s
conduct was within the “range of professionally reasonable judgments,”
and even if counsel had more effectively presented mitigating factors,
the resulting sentence would have remained the same because of the
116
overwhelming aggravating factors against Washington.
117
Scholarly criticism of the Strickland standard has been scathing.
Foremost among Strickland’s critics, Professor Richard Klein notes that
courts do not attach a similar “strong presumption” in favor of reasonable performance when reviewing the conduct of other profes118
sionals, such as physicians, surgeons, accountants, and architects.
Furthermore, the presumption makes little sense “[i]n light of the
widespread acknowledgment of the existence of a crisis in the quality
119
of representation provided to indigent defendants.” With respect to
the “prejudice” prong, Strickland also invites courts to engage in historical revisionist speculation, yet Professor Klein complains that it is
often difficult to speculate as to the effect a competent attorney may
120
have had on a case’s outcome. The difficulty is compounded when
the record on appeal does “not reveal weaknesses in the prosecutor’s
121
In other words, an attorcase because of counsel’s incompetence.”
ney’s incompetence may be the reason there is insufficient evidence
on the record for an appellate court to spot incompetence in the first
place. Thus, Strickland establishes a Catch-22 for those who need the
right to effective counsel the most: by considering the weight of the
evidence against a defendant, the “prejudice” prong either allows
courts to ignore an attorney’s egregious errors or prevents them from

115

See id. at 689-90 (“The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney
performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.”).
116
See id. at 699-700 (deciding against the defendant on both prongs).
117
See Thomas, supra note 105, at 547 (“Scholars have concluded that the Strickland approach is a cynical dead end, designed to affirm all but the most deeply flawed
convictions.”).
118
See Klein, supra note 10, at 640-41 (comparing the Strickland standard to ones
used for other types of expert testimony).
119
Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD.
L. REV. 1433, 1452 (1999).
120
See Klein, supra note 10, at 641 (“The absence of effective representation may
well have had an effect on the entire proceeding that was so pervasive that it is not
possible to accurately determine the degree of prejudice.”).
121
Klein, supra note 119, at 1467.
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122

realizing that such errors occurred.
Finally, although the Strickland
Court was motivated by concerns of finality and efficiency, it has
“created the worst of all possible outcomes”: the standard “has proved
virtually impossible to meet” but “[b]ecause the standard is fairly open123
ended . . . it does little to forestall the filing of ineffectiveness claims.”
Not only does the Strickland standard create individual injustices
for many defendants by effectively vitiating their Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, but it also contributes to the main systemic failure of
124
the Gideon mandate: inadequate funding for indigent defense. Due
in large part to Strickland’s low bar for attorney competence, only 6 of
103 ineffectiveness claims succeeded in the California Supreme Court
from January 1, 1989, to April 21, 1996, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld only 6 of 158 during the same time
125
By “uncritically [accepting] the status quo as ‘effective,’
period.
[Strickland] creates no incentive for states to improve on existing stan126
If the bar for effective
dards of legal representation for the poor.”
counsel were set higher, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
consequently were upheld with greater frequency, states might respond
by improving indigent defense to avoid the cost of reprosecuting cases.
The Strickland standard also effectively precludes litigation challenging counsel competence based on objective factors surrounding
the representation. In a companion case to Strickland, United States v.
Cronic, the Court held that “only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be
127
The
sufficient without inquiry into counsel’s actual performance.”
facts at hand, extrinsic to the appointed counsel’s actual performance—such as his youth, inexperience with jury trials or with the
subject matter at hand, and that the government had prepared the
122

See Klein, supra note 10, at 645 (“When there have been the most egregious failings by counsel is exactly when the record may indeed be barren of any indication of
reasonable doubt. Yet, it is those very situations where courts now need not even proceed to attempt to discover the failings of counsel.”).
123
Cole, supra note 12, at 114.
124
For criticisms of state indigent defense funding, see STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL
AID & INDIGENT DEF., supra note 11, at 7-9, which examines testimony about underfunded indigent defense services throughout the country. See also Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty
Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 816-21 (“The most fundamental reason for the
poor quality or absence of legal services for the poor in the criminal justice system is the
refusal of governments to allocate sufficient funds for indigent defense programs.”).
125
Cole, supra note 12, at 117.
126
Id. at 114.
127
466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984).
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case for four-and-a-half years while the attorney was appointed twentyfive days before trial—bore on the adequacy of his representation but
were not “circumstances that in themselves make it unlikely that res128
pondent received the effective assistance of counsel.” Cronic “made
any systemic challenges to the adequacy of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment based on the inadequacy of funding and resources virtually impossible, and effectively required case-by-case adjudication of
129
Sixth Amendment claims.”
III. FOUNDATIONS FOR CIVIL INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
In light of the negative effects Strickland has had on the right to
appointed counsel for criminal defendants, the Civil Gideon movement
should consider how failures in the process will be remedied to ensure
that Civil Gideon will not become a hollow right. Before identifying alternative standards for ineffectiveness of counsel, however, this Part
explores the grounds for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
against appointed counsel in civil cases.
Unlike the ineffectiveness claim brought in Strickland, claims in
the civil context will not be grounded in the Sixth Amendment. Under normal circumstances, where civil counsel is not appointed, a
malpractice suit is the only remedy available to a civil litigant who be130
lieves that a lawyer’s negligence resulted in an adverse judgment.
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)—and its analogs in
state procedural rules—provide relief from judgment for “mistake, in131
advertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” these rules generally
apply only to cases in which defendants seek relief from default judg132
ments. A civil attorney’s gross negligence is usually imputed to the
133
client based on agency law principles. Imputing the attorney’s inef128

Id. at 648, 665-66.
Cole, supra note 12, at 116.
130
See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 n.10 (1962) (“[I]f an attorney’s
conduct falls substantially below what is reasonable under the circumstances, the
client’s remedy is against the attorney in a suit for malpractice.”).
131
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1).
132
See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 612 (4th ed. 2005) (“In
practice . . . the rule most frequently is invoked successfully in the default setting or
when the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed for failure to prosecute and judgment was entered by mistake since the party fully intended actively to litigate the dispute.” (footnotes omitted)).
133
See Link, 370 U.S. at 634 (“[E]ach party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyeragent and is considered to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged
upon the attorney.’” (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879))).
129
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fective representation to the client, however, does not seem appropriate when an indigent litigant did not freely select her attorney but rather was appointed one by the court.
If a Civil Gideon is achieved through litigation, at either the state
or federal level, the right to effective assistance of counsel will likely
follow from the Supreme Court’s current right-to-counsel jurisprudence. The Court has long recognized “that the right to counsel is the
134
right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Currently, when the caseby-case balance of the Mathews factors under Lassiter compels a court to
appoint counsel, “presumably there is a federal constitutional right to
135
Therefore, if courts granted the
effective assistance of counsel.”
expansion in the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause,
they will likely acknowledge the corollary right to effective counsel.
Achieving recognition of a right to effective assistance of counsel
may be more difficult if Civil Gideon rights are formed through legislation. The argument could be made that because the statutory rights
are not grounded in the Constitution—as they would be if judicially
created—there is no right to effective assistance of counsel. The
Supreme Court has denied the right to effective assistance of counsel
in discretionary criminal appeals when there is no Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel, even when the lower court used its discre136
tion to appoint counsel. Similarly, “a series of inconsistent California
appellate court decisions” in the 1980s and 1990s sometimes declined
to recognize a parent’s right to effective assistance of counsel where
137
counsel was appointed pursuant to statute. The California legislature
134

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
Calkins, supra note 20, at 196; see also Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d
153, 254-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that when mothers in dependency hearings are
entitled to counsel according to Lassiter’s application of the Mathews factors, ineffective
assistance of counsel violates their constitutional rights).
136
See Calkins, supra note 20, at 196 n.87 (“Because there is no constitutional right
to counsel for a discretionary appeal, there is no right to effective assistance of counsel
to prosecute a discretionary appeal.” (citation omitted) (citing Wainwright v. Torna, 455
U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982), and Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974))). Likewise, until
Attorney General Holder vacated the decision, former Attorney General Mukasey’s decision in In re Compean held that “[b]ecause the Constitution does not confer a right to
counsel . . . in [alien] removal proceedings, . . . there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 726 (A.G. 2009),
vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009).
137
See Patton, supra note 20, at 229-31 (“Although the California courts appear to
have determined that there is no right to effective assistance of counsel for statutorily
appointed attorneys, the legislature has recently provided that right: ‘All parties who
are represented by counsel at dependency proceedings shall be entitled to competent
counsel.’” (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317.5(a) (West 2008))).
135
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138

eventually amended the statute to require competent counsel. Notably, in In re Arturo A., the court concluded that “it is reasonably well
established that reversal based on ineffective assistance of counsel is not
139
available when the right to counsel was only statutory.” The In re Arturo A. court, however, appears to be an exception among state courts
when it comes to recognizing a right to effective assistance of counsel
140
The majority position
when a statute mandates appointed counsel.
recognizes that a “statutory right is meaningless unless it is the effective
141
assistance of counsel to which the [party] is entitled.”
Apart from statutory interpretation, there are due process grounds
for recognizing ineffectiveness claims when counsel is appointed by
statute. In Nicholson v. Williams, a class action upholding a preliminary
injunction against a city child-services administration for its conduct in
dependency cases, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded that New York violated the Due Process
Clause by providing mothers ineffective counsel in supposed com142
pliance with a state statutory right to counsel.
The court reasoned
that when New York “undertake[s] the role of good samaritan in providing counsel to the needy, inducing their reliance and preventing
others from assisting, the State and City must carry out the role they
143
have assumed with propriety.” The court found that the provision of
counsel for abused mothers was “largely a sham” because it
cruelly supplies attorneys who can not, and do not, properly represent
[them]. They do not investigate. They do not consult with their client.
They are not available for consultation. Their very existence delays hearings and proper prompt resolution of cases in Family Court, resulting in
unnecessary separation of mothers and children and in unnecessarily
prolonging those separations. The result is a practice and policy by the
State and City of New York violating the substantive and procedural con144
stitutional rights of many abused mothers and their children.

138

Id.
San Diego Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Veronica A. (In re Arturo A.), 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 131, 135 (Ct. App. 1992).
140
See Calkins, supra note 20, at 197 n.91 (listing state cases that recognize ineffectiveness claims for counsel appointed in accordance with state statutory provisions).
141
Id. at 197.
142
See 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165, 256-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Offering counsel to a
mother accused of neglect, and then hamstringing that counsel in such a way that the
mother is likely to receive inadequate representation impairs the litigant’s Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel.”).
143
Id. at 257.
144
Id. at 253-54.
139
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If the Civil Gideon movement wishes to avoid demoralizing experiences with statutory expansions of the right to appointed counsel
like that discussed in Nicholson, it must establish grounds for litigants
to challenge the effectiveness of counsel. Given California’s experience, it is best if the legislation granting a statutory right to counsel
145
also provides that such counsel must be effective.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO STRICKLAND FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Unfortunately, most jurisdictions that provide appointed counsel
in parental terminations either expressly adopt Strickland or impliedly
follow it, with the predictable result that these “courts decline to find
146
ineffectiveness.” As the Civil Gideon movement begins achieving results, however, courts should reevaluate the propriety of applying a
standard that is based on the Sixth Amendment and is intended for
the criminal context. Procedural safeguards unique to the criminal
context, and the criticism Strickland has received even in that context,
make applying the Strickland standard inappropriate in the civil set147
ting. Chief among the criminal procedural safeguards absent in the
civil setting is the high standard of proof—proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, rather than by preponderance of the evidence. Additionally,
in parental rights terminations, “[w]ith few exceptions . . . the parents
are not judged by a jury; and there are often significant exceptions to
148
After articulating the
the application of the rules of evidence.”
principles and policy goals for a standard by which to evaluate the effectiveness of counsel, this Part evaluates several possible alternatives
to the Strickland standard that may be better suited to the civil context.
A. Principles and Policy Goals
Two principal goals and two secondary goals inform the standard
for ineffectiveness of counsel. The central question in Strickland is
whether an indigent litigant’s appointed lawyer will effectively subject
145

For a discussion of another state that codifies effective assistance of counsel in
its statutory grant of appointed counsel, see Calkins, supra note 20, at 198 n.97. “Minnesota’s statute provides for effective assistance of counsel in termination proceedings.” Id. “The child, parent, guardian or custodian has the right to effective assistance of counsel in connection with a proceeding in juvenile court.” Id. (citing MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260C.163(3)(a) (West 2003)).
146
Calkins, supra note 20, at 214-15.
147
See id. at 229 (“Termination proceedings, while formal, do not have all of the
procedural safeguards of criminal proceedings.”).
148
Id.
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the opposition’s case or defense to the type of adversarial testing “that
149
our system counts on to produce just results.”
Put another way, the
Strickland Court’s main concern was the accuracy of outcomes. Independent of “just results,” however, is also the value of ensuring that out150
comes “are obtained only through fundamentally fair procedures.”
In his article, Professor Klein notes that the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice recognized
that “[f]air treatment of every individual—fair in fact and also perceived
to be fair by those affected—is an essential element of justice and a prin151
cipal objective of the American criminal justice system.” Indeed, Professor Tom Tyler’s research on procedural justice supports this proposition by demonstrating that “people care about the decision-making
process. They consider evidence about representation, neutrality, bias,
honesty, quality of decision, and consistency. People’s concerns about
152
decision making are not simply instrumental.” If ineffective assistance
of counsel “becomes one of the many indignities visited upon some153
one” who comes in contact with the civil justice system, it may undermine the legitimacy of the judicial process, discouraging compliance
154
with court orders and encouraging people to resort to self-help.
In addition to the principal goal of achieving justice, Susan Calkins,
a former associate justice of the Maine Supreme Court, identifies two
related “secondary goals” in Strickland: preventing “‘proliferation of in155
156
effectiveness challenges’” and “efficiently processing claims.” These
secondary goals are grounded in the judiciary’s interest in finality,
157
which the Strickland Court characterized as “profound.” Ironically, as
Professor Cole suggests, Strickland in practice partially undermines this
finality by articulating a “fairly open-ended” standard that is difficult

149

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
Id. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151
Klein, supra note 10, at 642 (alteration in original) (quoting PRESIDENT’S
COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY, at viii (1967)).
152
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 175 (1990).
153
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 764 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154
See TYLER, supra note 152, at 172 (“If people have an experience not characterized by fair procedures, their later compliance with the law will be based less strongly
on the legitimacy of legal authorities.”).
155
See Calkins, supra note 20, at 230 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 690 (1984)).
156
Id.
157
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94.
150
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to meet, yet vague enough that it fails to discourage criminal defen158
dants from claiming ineffectiveness of counsel on appeal.
B. The Fundamental-Fairness Approach
In her article on appellate standards for ineffectiveness claims in
parental rights termination cases, Associate Justice Calkins explores an
alternative to Strickland that Oregon courts developed and several other
159
Although this test apstates adopted either explicitly or implicitly.
pears to be stricter than Strickland, it is probably not a viable alternative
for broad application in the civil context because it raises the bar on effectiveness through an even more amorphous standard than Strickland,
similarly threatening legitimate interests in the finality of judgments.
As Associate Justice Calkins explains, in State ex rel. Juvenile Department of Multnomah County v. Geist, the Oregon Supreme Court adopted
“‘a standard which seeks to determine whether a termination proceeding was “fundamentally fair,”’ and referred to the Strickland standard
160
as ‘more stringent.’”
In contrast to the Strickland Court’s focus on
outcomes, the Oregon Supreme Court appears to have recognized the
legitimate interest in procedural justice when it stated “that the essence
of fundamental fairness is the right to be heard at a meaningful time
161
and in a meaningful manner.” With respect to attorney performance,
the court stated that “[a]lthough no client has a constitutional or statutory right to a ‘perfect’ defense, fundamental fairness requires that ap162
pointed counsel exercise professional skill and judgment.” Although
this standard is similar to the adequate-counsel inquiry Strickland established, the presumption of attorney competence is noticeably absent in
163
Geist. Also similar to Strickland, Oregon’s standard purports to require
164
the claimant to show prejudice. Examining two Oregon Court of Ap158

Cole, supra note 12, at 114.
See Calkins, supra note 20, at 216-18 (examining the standard established in
State ex rel. Juvenile Department of Multnomah County v. Geist (In re Geist), 796 P.2d 1193
(Or. 1990)).
160
Id. at 216-17 (quoting Geist, 796 P.2d at 1201, 1203).
161
Id. at 217.
162
Geist, 796 P.2d at 1203 (citation omitted) (quoting Krummacher v. Gierloff, 627
P.2d 458, 464 (Or. 1981) (in banc)).
163
See Calkins, supra note 20, at 223 (“Strickland calls for a ‘strong’ presumption
that counsel’s performance was adequate, with a ‘highly deferential’ review of the attorney’s performance, whereas Geist does not mention any presumption of adequacy.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984))).
164
See id. at 218 (“Geist requires a showing that the attorney’s performance denied
the parent a fair trial and is sufficiently poor to call the trial court’s decision ‘into se159
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165

peals cases, as well as opinions from several other state courts that
166
have adopted the fundamental-fairness approach, Associate Justice
Calkins concludes that, in practice, the fundamental-fairness standard’s
prejudice prong is less demanding on claimants, and therefore the test
167
in operation is stricter on attorney error than is Strickland.
The strength of the fundamental-fairness standard, however, is
also its weakness with regard to potential widespread adoption: “It
can . . . be seen as more flexible because it is less doctrinaire than the
168
Strickland standard.”
By applying a more amorphous test, the fundamental-fairness standard may be better at achieving justice, both
substantive and procedural, than Strickland. But these gains may come
at the cost of the “secondary goals” Associate Justice Calkins identifies.
The flood of ineffectiveness claims that became the norm in criminal
appeals may besiege the civil justice system if courts adopt a standard
that is more vague than Strickland. Although interest in finality should
not be placed above the goal of achieving justice, courts are not likely
to look favorably on the fundamental-fairness standard if it opens the
floodgates to ineffectiveness claims, especially if the expansion of the
right to civil counsel brings additional cases into the civil justice system.
C. Pre- and Post-Strickland Alternatives in the Criminal Context
Standards that either existed before the Supreme Court established the current Strickland standard or were developed by states that
declined to adopt Strickland offer viable alternatives for the civil con-

rious question.’ Furthermore, the trial court’s decision terminating parental rights
should not be reversed if the reviewing court is satisfied that even with adequate counsel the result would ‘inevitably’ have been the same.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Geist, 796 P.2d at 1204)).
165
See State ex rel. State Office for Servs. to Children & Families v. Thomas (In re
Stephens), 12 P.3d 537, 543-44 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (applying the fundamental-fairness
standard to find the father’s counsel inadequate due to a lack of preparation and a
failure to advocate a theory for the father against termination); State ex rel. State Office
for Servs. to Children & Families v. Rogers (In re Eldridge), 986 P.2d 726, 731 (Or. Ct.
App. 1999) (finding the mother’s counsel’s inadequacy fundamentally unfair in part
because counsel’s attempts at working with her were “half-hearted, at best”).
166
See, e.g., Johnson v. J.K.C, Sr. (In re Interest of J.C., Jr.), 781 S.W.2d 226, 228
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (adopting a “relaxed” standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in civil proceedings requiring attorneys to be “effective in providing a meaningful hearing”).
167
See Calkins, supra note 20, at 233 (“[T]he fundamental-fairness standard seems
likely to raise the level of attorney competence because it makes counsel more responsible for ensuring that the parents receive a fair trial.”).
168
Id.
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text by establishing a stricter test for effectiveness while still preserving
the judiciary’s interest in finality. Pre-Strickland, the majority of courts
169
adopted some form of the two-prong test. Although most “applied a
kind of ‘malpractice’ standard” for the performance prong, some
“adopted instead a ‘guidelines’ approach, in which they tested the law170
yer’s conduct against a set of minimal duties or guidelines.” Scholarly
commentators “virtually universally preferred the guidelines approach, because it was more susceptible to objective application and
171
gave clear notice to attorneys and courts as to what was demanded.”
Regarding the prejudice prong, “[t]he vast majority of the
courts . . . required a showing that the counsel’s deficient performance impaired the defense in a material way,” and some put the
burden for the prejudice prong on the government rather than the
defendant, “maintaining that once a defendant showed that his attorney’s performance was deficient, the government bore the burden of
showing that the deficiency did not affect the result, much as the
government must show ‘harmless error’ when defendants identify
172
other constitutional defects in their prosecution.”
Hawaii serves as an example of a state that declined to adopt
Strickland. Pre-Strickland, Hawaii followed the majority position on the
two-prong approach, requiring the defendant to show that counsel
made “specific errors or omissions . . . reflecting counsel’s lack of skill,
judgment or diligence” and “that these errors or omissions resulted in
either the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially meri173
torious defense.” After Strickland, the Supreme Court of Hawaii decided to continue this approach on state grounds after noting that
“the Strickland test has been criticized as being unduly difficult for a de174
Although Hawaii was not among the minority of
fendant to meet.”
jurisdictions to place the burden of demonstrating absence of prejudice
on the government, the burden on the defendant to show “withdrawal
or substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense” appears
easier to satisfy than the “but for” causation required by Strickland. The
“performance” standard is not significantly different from that in Strick-

169

See Cole, supra note 12, at 111 (“[T]he vast majority [of courts] . . . adopted a
test that looked at two considerations: the attorney’s performance; and the effect of
the attorney’s performance, often referred to as ‘prejudice.’”).
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 112.
173
State v. Antone, 615 P.2d 101, 104 (Haw. 1980).
174
State v. Smith, 712 P.2d 496, 500 n.7 (Haw. 1986).
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land, but, like Oregon’s Geist standard, Hawaii’s approach does not
establish a presumption of attorney competence that the defendant
must overcome. Therefore, the same criticism concerning finality applies: the vagueness of the standard for competence will not discourage
losing parties from filing ineffectiveness claims on appeal.
Establishing a standard for ineffectiveness claims based on professional guidelines—a pre-Strickland approach that commentators favored at the time—is the best alternative to Strickland for ineffectiveness claims in the civil context for three reasons. First, articulating
minimum standards will help raise the bar for effective advocacy, while
avoiding the finality problems of other approaches. By providing
objective standards by which to measure counsel’s performance,
courts will provide better notice to potential appellants about what
courts consider to be inadequate representation. Although the Strickland Court feared that using a guidelines-based approach would discourage lawyers from providing aggressive and zealous advocacy for
their clients, prior accounts of abysmal lawyering in the absence of any
such standard and the current virtual impossibility of a successful ineffectiveness claim suggest that indigent litigants would be no worse off
under a guidelines approach than they are now. Even if standards
discourage some lawyers from doing little beyond the bare minimum,
at least such a minimum would be defined.
Second, like the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice used by preStrickland courts as guidelines for assessing attorney performance,
there are several “civil-side standards, developed by the American Bar
Association, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and
other standard-setting bodies, that can serve as a useful guide to
175
There are not civil standards for all areas where attorneys
states.”

175

Abel, supra note 18, at 549. For the particular examples that Abel notes, see SECSTANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS
(2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/
family/reports/standards_childcustody.pdf; SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N,
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (1996), available at http://www.abanet.org/family/reports/standards_
abuseneglect.pdf; and NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR INVOLUNTARY
CIVIL COMMITMENT (1986), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/
KIS_MenHeaGuideInvolCCtmt.pdf. Recently, the ABA published a set of guidelines for
lawyers representing clients in civil protection order cases. See generally COMM’N ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS
REPRESENTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND STALKING IN CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER CASES (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/
docs/StandardsCommentary.pdf (reiterating the need for victims to obtain civil protection orders and providing guidance to lawyers representing them in pursuit thereof).
TION OF FAMILY LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N,
REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CUSTODY CASES
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may be appointed to represent indigent litigants, and that the ABA
and similar organizations should develop such standards as the Civil
176
In this vein, the ABA recently pubGideon movement progresses.
177
lished Standards for the Provision of Civil Legal Aid, which contains
standards for practitioners that courts could use to fashion a guideline
178
alternative to Strickland.
Third, recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that the current
Court may be more accepting of a guidelines-based approach than was
the Strickland Court. In a series of death penalty appeals—Williams v.
179
180
181
Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, and Rompilla v. Beard —the Supreme
Court revived the notion “that the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
should be used as norms for determining what is objectively reasonable
182
All of the cases involved “a challenge to trial counrepresentation.”
sel’s investigation in a capital case,” and the Supreme Court found inef183
fective assistance of counsel in all three. In all three opinions, the majority “quoted extensively from the ABA standards” in arriving at its
184
Significantly, Justice
determination of inadequate representation.
O’Connor, who authored the majority opinion rejecting a guidelines
approach in Strickland, authored the Wiggins opinion and “provided the
essential fifth vote in Williams,” strongly suggesting that “the Court in185
tentionally changed course.”
176

See Abel, supra note 18, at 549 (recognizing that “there are no national standards for some types of civil cases in which counsel are currently appointed” and asserting that “[a]ny expansion of the right to counsel in civil cases should be accompanied by the development of standards for counsel in that kind of case”).
177
STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N,
STANDARDS FOR THE PROVISION OF CIVIL LEGAL AID (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/civillegalaidstds2007.pdf.
178
See id. at 209-68 (articulating standards for, among other things, client participation, investigation, legal counseling, negotiation, and litigation strategy).
179
529 U.S. 362 (2000).
180
539 U.S. 510 (2003).
181
545 U.S. 374 (2005).
182
John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 129 (2007).
183
Id. at 146-47.
184
Id. at 147.
185
Id. at 149-50. Blume and Neumann also note that all three cases were governed by a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006), meaning that “[i]n order to grant the writs of habeas corpus, the Court had to conclude that the lower state courts’ decisions that trial counsel’s
performance had not been objectively unreasonable were themselves objectively unreasonable.” Blume & Neumann, supra note 182, at 151. Such a finding appears to
depart from the “strong presumption” of attorney competence articulated in Strickland.
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Although the Court appeared to retreat from its support of the ABA
guidelines in the recent opinion in Bobby v. Van Hook, the Court did not
close the door to an effectiveness of counsel approach that uses ABA
186
In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Sixth
guidelines.
Circuit erred by treating the 131-page ABA guidelines, published in
2003, as instrumental in finding that a death row inmate’s lawyer pro187
vided ineffective assistance of counsel in a 1985 sentencing hearing.
Apart from the anachronism of the approach, the Court took issue with
the appellate court’s treatment of “the ABA’s 2003 Guidelines not
merely as evidence of what reasonably diligent attorneys would do, but
as inexorable commands with which all capital counsel ‘must fully
188
The Court, however, noted that it was not ruling on a
comply.’”
189
“less categorical” use of the ABA guidelines, leaving open the possibility that a guidelines-based approach to effectiveness of counsel will
continue to develop. If these cases signal a change in the direction of
190
the Court’s jurisprudence on effectiveness of counsel claims, then
the Civil Gideon movement may be positioned to circumvent Strickland.
CONCLUSION
In the summer of 2010, the ABA adopted the Model Access Act, a
model statute intended to aid states in passing legislation to expand
access to appointed counsel according to the goal set forth by ABA
191
Resolution 112A four years ago. Although not preclusive of litigation
strategies, this Model Act strongly suggests that expanded access to
counsel in civil cases will arrive through legislation rather than litigation. As Gideon’s experience suggests, however, states’ adoption of this
type of act will not be a panacea for indigent civil litigants. Appellate
standards for effectiveness of counsel will play an important role in
determining the extent of the right and the amount of funding a state
needs to provide this type of counsel to litigants. A guidelines-based
186

Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009).
See id. at 17.
188
Id. (quoting Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690, 693 (6th Cir. 2006)) (citing Van
Hook v. Anderson, 560 F.3d 523, 526 (6th Cir. 2009)).
189
Id. at 17 n.1.
190
See Blume & Neumann, supra note 182, at 164 (“Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla
mark a significant step forward in ineffective assistance of counsel litigation.”).
191
See AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, MODEL ACCESS ACT
§ 3(A) (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/
104_Revised_FINAL_Aug_2010.pdf (“[P]ublic legal services shall be available at State
expense, upon application by a financially-eligible person, in any adversarial proceeding . . . in which basic human needs . . . are at stake.”).
187
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standard, used by many courts pre-Strickland and in recent Supreme
Court death penalty cases, is the best alternative for ensuring that the
interests of justice are served in a way that does not unduly tax the judicial system with a flood of civil appeals. Fortunately, the Civil Gideon
movement is still in its infancy, giving the ABA an opportunity to shape
the coming debate in order to achieve an effective Civil Gideon.

